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Abstract 
The Euro crisis has been the biggest shock European economy has been through since the beginning of 
European integration. It made apparent a series of structural imbalances and failures in the design of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), putting into question its own nature and survival. In spite of 
the doubts that emerged, the response to the crisis eventually led to a deepening of economic integration 
within the EU. Which were the driving forces and key actors of this deepening in integration? This 
paper focuses on the strengthening of the fiscal and economic pillars of EMU, using three theories of 
European integration: Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and New Intergovernment-
alism. The paper argues that the deepening of integration can be theorized as the result of asymmetrical 
interdependence and differences in bargaining power among member states, which decide to give up 
national sovereignty as a tool for reaching credible commitments. 
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1. Introduction 
Started in 2010, and still not fully over in some countries, the Euro crisis has been the biggest shock 
European economy has been through since the beginning of European integration. Triggered by the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis, it made apparent a series of structural imbalances and failures in the 
design of the Eurozone, putting into question the own nature of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the survival of the common currency. 
In spite of the doubts that emerged concerning the future of the Euro, the response to the crisis 
eventually led to a deepening process of integration in the area of economic governance, involving a 
transfer of competences towards the supranational level. The main decisions in this area were the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a permanent bailout mechanism, the 
creation of a European Banking Union, and the deepening on fiscal and economic coordination 
measures through the expansion of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
How can this be explained? Which were the key actors and driving forces of the negotiation 
processes that led to more integration during the Euro crisis? Different integration theories would give 
different answers to this research question. This paper will assess the answers given by three of these 
theories: Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and New Intergovernmentalism. This choice 
seeks to provide a wide approach to the topic, through the combination of grand theories with more 
recent approaches, as well as of different views about which are the driving forces and key actors of 
European integration. 
This paper will focus on the deepening of the economic and fiscal pillars of the EMU during the 
Euro crisis. This choice responds to the strong implications that the coordination of fiscal and economic 
policies has for national sovereignty, as well as for the room of maneuver left to member states in the 
forming of national budgets.  
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The paper will proceed as follows: section 2 provides a closer look at the strengthening of fiscal 
coordination during the Euro crisis. Section 3 establishes the analytical framework through a review of 
the state-of-the-art, the operationalization of the analyzed theories and the development of the data and 
methods for analysis. Section 4 reconstructs the negotiation processes on fiscal and economic 
coordination and assesses the data with the expectations from section 3. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The strengthening of fiscal coordination during the Euro crisis 
As advanced in the introduction, the Euro crisis led to a deeper coordination of economic policy in the 
EU: “The pre-crisis institutional framework considerably advanced under all main policy areas of 
EMU” (Niemann and Ionnau 2015, 199). This section will outline the characteristics of the four main 
decisions taken in the area of economic and fiscal coordination starting in 2009 and until March 2012: 
the European Semester, the Euro Plus Pact, the Six-pack and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), also known as ‘Fiscal Compact’.  
The European Semester was negotiated throughout 2010 and adopted starting in January 2011. 
It is “the EU's annual cycle of economic policy guidance and surveillance” (European Commission 
2016b), and it consists of the yearly monitoring by the Commission of member states’ budgetary and 
macroeconomic policies. After this monitoring, the Commission provides every country with specific 
recommendations for the following 12-18 months (European Commission 2016a). 
The Euro Plus Pact, is an intergovernmental agreement adopted under the Open Method of 
Coordination in March 2011 and signed by all member states except the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Sweden and the UK. It was conceived as “an intergovernmental solution to increase fiscal and economic 
discipline in the Member States” (European Political Strategy Centre 2015), focusing on four areas: 
competitiveness, employment, sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability. The 
monitoring and implementation of the agreement was developed in an intergovernmental framework, 
without any involvement from the Commission. 
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The Six-pack, consisting of five directives and one regulation with the aim of strengthening the 
SGP, was adopted by all member states in December 2011. It introduces the quantification of what is 
considered to be a significant deviation from the medium-term [macroeconomic] objectives of the SGP. 
It also allows the possibility of launching the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in cases of national 
debts exceeding the allowed 60%. Finally, it introduces the possibility of financial sanctions applied 
through reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV)1 for those countries not complying with the rules.  
Finally, the TSCG is an intergovernmental treaty, not embedded on EU legislation, signed by all 
European member states with the exception of the Czech Republic and the UK. It runs in parallel to the 
Six-pack, complementing it while including stronger provisions. The most important for the present 
analysis will be the requirement that member states shall include the deficit provisions concerning the 
SGP into their national legal systems, “preferably of constitutional nature” (European Commission 
2013). 
 
3. Analytical framework 
The Euro crisis being a recent event, it is still generating a wide range of literature analyzing it from 
different domains. This section will provide a closer look to the existing literature on the topic of the 
Euro crisis from a European Studies point of view, focusing on those analyses that aim to identify the 
dynamics and processes behind the deepening of European integration during the crisis.  
The debate about which theory can explain better the deepening of European integration 
triggered by the crisis is still an ongoing one in the literature, and those who have contributed to it have 
stated that there is still scope for further research (i.e. Niemann & Ionnau 2015, Schimmelfennig 2015). 
The Euro crisis has been analyzed through the lenses of Neofunctionalism (Cooper, 2011; Niemann & 
                                                        
1 “According to the reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) ... a Commission recommendation is deemed to be adopted 
unless the Council decides by qualified majority to reject the recommendation within a given deadline that starts to run from 
the adoption of such a recommendation by the Commission.” (European Parliament 2011).  
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Ionnau, 2015), Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Schimmelfennig, 2015) and New Intergovernmentalism 
(Hodson & Puetter, 2013). Most of these studies provide a broad approach to integration during the 
Euro crisis, and thus leave scope for further research on more specific elements of the negotiation 
processes. This is the gap that this paper aims to fill by focusing on fiscal  and economic coordination. 
A closer look at the literature analyzing the Euro crisis from the point of view of these theories can be 
found in the following subsection.  
There is also a set of studies providing different explanations from the ones which will be 
assessed throughout this paper. Vilpisauskas (2013) focuses on the fact that integration nowadays 
cannot be explained without taking into account the dimension  of  national politics, while Leska  (2013) 
points to the relevance of new approaches such as social constructivism. Both identity politics and social 
constructivism are also vindicated by Börzel and Risse (2018) as useful mechanisms for understanding 
the dynamics of integration during the crisis. Another approach is brought up by Lefkofridi and 
Schmitter (2015), who see integration as a mix of processes of build-up, spill-around and retrenchment. 
There is also an increasing amount of literature addressing the issue of the key actors of the EU 
during the crisis, looking at inter-institutional relations and power dynamics among institutions. In this 
line, Chang (2013) analyzes fiscal integration during the crisis through a principal-agent approach that 
shows the limits of the Commission in pursuing its own interests. Also on the role of the Commission, 
Becker et al. (2016) observe a shift from a policy entrepreneurship to management functions as a result 
of the policy measures taken during the crisis. Finally, both Bressanelli and Chelotti (2016) and Schön-
Quinlivan and Scipioni (2017) emphasize the leading role of the European Council and the importance 
of Heads of State’s preferences when it came to shaping the final policy outcomes. 
The theories assessed  
The study of this paper will be performed through the lenses of three theories of European 
integration: those of Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and New Intergovernmentalism. 
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For each theory, the section will elaborate its main conceptual elements, survey the existing literature 
in the context of the crisis, and set the expectations for further analysis. 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism sees integration as a process whereby “political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
center” (Haas 1968, 16). It “contests both that states are unified actors and that they are the only relevant 
actors” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, p. 47) by giving special importance to the concept of elite 
socialization, a process whereby loyalties shift towards a new center. This is complemented by the role 
of interest groups: by shifting their operational arena towards the supranational level, expectations 
develop that “common problems can be more easily met by a federal authority” (Haas 1968, xxxiii). 
The main explanation of the driving forces of integration given by Neofunctionalism lies in the 
concept of spillover, which is presented in three main ways: functional, political and cultivated. 
Functional spillover refers to the idea that integration in one sector leads to integration in other sectors: 
“cooperation in one policy area would create pressure in a neighboring policy area, placing it on the 
political agenda, and ultimately leading to further integration” (Jensen, 2010, pp. 72-73). Political 
spillover explains further integration as the result of political actors becoming “aware that their interests 
can no longer be adequately served at the national level” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 94). Finally, 
cultivated spillover focuses on the role of the Commission and other supranational institutions who use 
their role as mediators of diverging interests as an opportunity to expand their competences: “[the] lack 
of agreement between governments may lead to an expanded role for the central institution; in other 
words, Member States may delegate difficult problems” (Lindberg, 1963/2006, p. 124). 
Neofunctionalism has been used as a tool for analyzing the response to the Euro crisis, but also 
the origins of the crisis itself. Already in 2011, Cooper (2011) discussed the crisis as a revenge of 
neofunctionalism, claiming that it had been triggered by a spillover effect: monetary integration pushing 
towards a fiscal union. This view is shared by Zimmermann, who argues that neofunctionalist logics 
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provide “a powerful tool to understand how the crisis of the euro emerged” (Zimmermann 2016, p. 
435). Beyond the origins of the crisis, Niemann and Ionnau (2015) conclude that the integrative impulse 
in the Eurozone responded mainly to functional pressures, supranational institutions and transnational 
interest groups. They also refer to the active role of the Commission, the European Parliament [EP] and 
the European Central Bank [ECB], stating that “the overall process towards further integration during 
the crisis would not have taken place to the same extent without [their] involvement” (Niemann and 
Ionnau 2015, 209). 
Neofunctionalism would explain further integration in the area of economic governance as the 
result of spillover processes. In terms of functional spillover, integration in one area (monetary policy) 
would lead to functional pressures and eventually to further integration in another area (fiscal and 
economic policy). Political spillover would expect member states, as well as interest groups, to realize 
that their interests can no longer be served at a national level and thus shift towards a supranational 
approach. As for cultivated spillover, the supranational actors would be expected to take advantage of 
the different positions of member states concerning the resolution of the economic crisis, using this 
opportunity for setting the agenda and increasing its power. For Neofunctionalism, the key actors of 
this process would be supranational actors such as the Commission, the ECB or transnational interest 
groups.  
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
As a theory, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) considers member states of the Union to be the 
main actors of European integration, which is seen as the result of a “series of rational choices made by 
national leaders who consistently [pursue] economic interests” (Moravcsik 1998, 3). Concerning the 
main actors of this process, “where neofunctionalism emphasizes the active role of supranational 
officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, [LI] stresses instead passive institutions and the autonomy of 
national leaders” (Moravcsik, 1993/2006, p. 300). For LI, there are three main driving forces of 
European integration: economic interdependence among member states, the relative bargaining power 
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of the involved governments, and delegation in supranational institutions as a tool to enhance the 
credibility of inter-state commitments (Moravcsik 1998).  
LI sees the formation of preferences determining the negotiation process as being defined in the 
national arena and “constrained by the interests of dominant, usually economic, groups within society” 
(Cini 2010, 97). Thus, the preferences of national governments mainly reflect concrete economic 
interests, even if geopolitical ones are also important (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). For LI, the 
outcomes of international negotiations reflect the result of the asymmetrical interdependence and the 
relative bargaining power of the actors. Finally, LI explains delegation as the result of two main 
incentives: the creation of credible commitments and the reduction of transaction costs. With transaction 
costs, Moravcsik refers to the costs of “identifying, negotiating and enforcing intergovernmental 
agreements under uncertainty” (Moravcsik, 1993/2006, p.297). In this context, institutions are seen as 
a tool for “reducing  the transaction of costs of further international negotiations  on specific issues and 
by providing the necessary information to reduce the state’s uncertainity about each other’s preferences 
and behavior” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 72). 
The Euro crisis has been analyzed from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist perspective by  
Schimmelfennig (2015), who claims that member states’ response to the crisis “can be explained 
plausibly as a result of intergovernmental bargaining based on partly converging and partly diverging 
member state interests and designed to strengthen the credibility of member state commitments to the 
common currency” (178). The author claims that the bargaining process has been member state-driven, 
with Germany playing a leading role as a result of its stronger bargaining power. This view is shared 
by other scholars (i.e. Leska 2013, Vilpisauskas 2013).  
Within the framework of the Euro crisis, LI would expect strong member states (notably 
Germany and France) to have a leading position during the negotiation processes, while supranational 
actors such as the Commission or transnational interest groups would play a marginal role. The 
economic interdependence resulting from the Euro crisis would lead these countries to pursue further 
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economic integration as a tool for defending their national interests (LI would emphasize these interests 
as defined in the national arena). Delegation would be seen as favoring these interests by creating 
credible commitments in terms of economic discipline affecting the whole of the Eurozone. The final 
outcome of negotiations would be the result of the relative bargaining power of member states in the 
framework of intergovernmental negotiations.  
New Intergovernmentalism 
The New Intergovernmentalism (NI) is a more recent theory, which focuses on the dynamics of 
integration in the post-Maastricht era. It sees the European Union as going through a process of 
“integration without supranationalization” (Bickerton et al., 2015, p. 39), where national governments 
are the key players, and the European Council and the Council the most important decision-making 
arenas.  
The two core components of NI are the following: a process towards more integration but 
outside the traditional community method, where member states are the main decision-makers, and the 
importance of consensus-seeking and “deliberation as an inherent feature of EU decision-making” 
(Puetter 2014, 38). While NI sustains the traditional LI idea of the EU as an intergovernmental regime 
designed to manage economic interdependence, it differs in its conception of preferences, assuming that 
these are no longer predefined (Puetter, 2014). For NI, decision-making processes are no longer 
determined by pre-stablished preferences coming from the national arena. Instead, they have become 
“increasingly deliberative and consensual” (Bickerton et al., 2015, p. 1). Furthermore, this New 
Intergovernmentalism also differs from LI in stating that the final outcome of the bargaining process is 
not the result of relative power of different actors, but of member states showing an ‘unprecedented 
determination to act collectively even in cases of severe disagreement’ (Hodson & Puetter, 2013, p. 
374). 
As for the role of supranational institutions, NI emphasizes the increasing importance of the 
European Council and the Council. For this theory, the Comission would no longer have a major role 
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as driver of European integration (Puetter 2014). In this line, NI shows member states as willing to 
“limit the further expansion of powers of the Commission and the Court of Justice” (Bickerton et al., 
2015, p. 39). 
Concerning the Euro crisis, Hodson and Puetter (2013) write about a presidentialization of Euro 
Area [EA] governance, referring to an increasing role of Heads of State in economic governance.  They 
also point towards the member states’ reluctance to empower the Commission in this area (Hodson & 
Puetter, 2013). This view is broadly accepted by Fabbrini, who has conceptualized the Six-Pack as an 
exception to the new intergovernmental direction of the EU (Fabbrini, 2013, pp. 1016-1017). Among 
the critics of this perspective,  Becker et al. (2016) argue that the impact of the crisis on the Commission 
is more nuanced than the explanation provided by NI, whereas Börzel and Risse (2018) argue that even 
if the European Council played a major role in crisis management, the outcomes were not those 
predicted by NI (p. 89). 
There are two main expectations coming from NI when applied to the Euro crisis. First, the most 
important decisions would be negotiated in intergovernmental arenas such as the Council and the 
European Council, whereas the traditional Community framework would decrease in importance. The 
outcome of negotiations is expected to build upon New Intergovernmental ways of collaboration in 
fiscal and economic governance. Second, the bargaining processes would be consensus-driven and no 
longer based on pre-defined national interests. As with LI, NI would expect the main actors to be 
member states who seek integration as a tool for facing the Euro crisis. However, the new 
intergovernmentalism approach does not give an outstanding role to strong member states: for NI, the 
key actor would be the European Council as a whole, and not only France and Germany.  
Identification of the variables 
In order to perform the assessment of the negotiation process through the three chosen theories, 
five variables have been identified within each of them.  
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Table 1. Identification of the variables 
 Neofunctionalism Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
New 
Intergovernmentalism 
Key actors Supranational Institutions Member states with stronger bargaining power 
Intergovernmental 
institutions such as the 
Council and the European 
Council 
Driving 
forces 
-Functional, political and 
cultivated spillover 
-Elite socialization 
-Economic and 
geopolitical interests 
-Economic 
interdependence among 
member states 
Economic 
interdependence among 
member states 
Reasons for 
delegation 
-Supranational institutions 
pushing for more 
competences 
-Role of interest groups 
-Enhance credibility of 
states commitments 
-Reducing transaction 
costs 
Further integration is not 
seen as a delegation of 
power towards 
supranational institutions 
Negotiation 
outcomes 
Result of spillover 
processes 
Result of relative 
bargaining power among 
member states 
Result of consensus-
seeking deliberation 
Preference 
formation 
Shift towards 
supranational arena National level 
Variable, not fixed from 
the national arena 
 
Data and methods for assessment 
The analysis of this paper will be carried out through the reconstruction of the negotiation 
processes related to the advances in the economic and fiscal pillars of the EMU during the Euro crisis. 
By narrowing down to these areas of the response to the crisis, the assessment will be able to focus not 
only on some crucial episodes, as some scholars have done before (i.e. Schimmelfennig, 2015), but to 
provide an exhaustive chronology of the events.   
While there is an increasing amount of literature dealing with the dynamics of further integration 
during the crisis, most of this work provides a broad overview of the crisis as a whole, leaving still a 
lack of more focused research on specific areas of integration that allows for a more comprehensive 
process tracing of the events. And while fiscal and economic coordination have been covered by other 
scholars (Chang 2013, Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016), there is still scope for complementing both the 
theoretical approaches of these contributions, as well as their empirical work by adding to their use of 
official sources and interviews a more detailed process-tracing of the events.  
11  
In order to elaborate this timeline, the analysis will look at the events from the beginning of the 
Euro crisis until the moment when the TSCG was signed in March 2012. The beginning will be set in 
October 2009, when Georges Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece at the time, revised the 
country’s deficit previsions from a 3.7% of GDP to a 12.5%, creating a risk of financial contagion in 
the Eurozone. The paper will focus on the four main decisions in the area of fiscal and economic 
coordination taken during this period: the European Semester, the Six-pack, the Euro Plus Pact and the 
TSCG, developed in section 2. The reconstruction will be performed through the analysis of documents 
such as European Council Conclusions, policy proposals, and drafts of the final treaty when available. 
Information emanating from press conferences, government statements and informal summits will be 
included as part of the analysis. 
Given that decisions in fiscal and economic governance directly affected all members of the EU, 
an exhaustive analysis of the actions of every single government is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, 
even if the analysis will aim to reflect a view as broad as possible of the global position in Europe, it 
has been decided to focus on the role of those considered in the literature to have been the main actors 
in the response to the crisis: Germany and France as the leading member states, and the European 
Commission as the most relevant supranational institution. This does not mean, however, that the 
analysis will be limited to those actors: the role of other institutions and member states will be analyzed 
when relevant for the negotiation process (for example, the role of the UK during the negotiations of 
the TSCG). 
The reconstruction will focus on the elements of the negotiations directly related to fiscal 
governance and the strengthening of the economic pillar of the EMU. However, it is almost impossible 
to isolate these from other negotiations directly related to the crisis. Thus, the analysis will only touch 
on elements such as the bailout agreements when these are necessary to understand certain outcomes.  
Once the negotiation process has been reconstructed, the analysis will proceed to identify within 
it the same variables identified in Table 1 regarding the theoretical frameworks: the main actors 
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involved in the process, the driving forces, the reasons for delegation, preference formation and the 
explanation of the final outcome. This will serve as a tool for the later assessment, which will be carried 
out through the comparison of each theory’s expectations in terms of each of the variables with the facts 
as explained through the construction of the chronology.  
 
4. The negotiation process behind further integration 
This section will reconstruct the negotiations concerning the strengthening of fiscal and economic 
coordination starting from the beginning of the Euro crisis in October 2009 until the moment when the 
TSCG was signed in March 2012. In order to do so, it with go through the five variables of study, 
looking at driving forces, the key actors, reasons for delegation, negotiation outcomes and preference 
formation during this time framework. 
Driving forces of the integration process 
The first mention of further coordination of economic policies in the EU appears on 25 March 
2010, when a statement from the Heads of State of the EA explicitly mentions the need for strengthening 
the SGP (Heads of State and Government of the Euro Area 2010). This is the same statement in which 
the possibility of bilateral loans to Greece is first mentioned, and it comes at a moment when imbalances 
and macroeconomic problems were becoming visible in the EA. Similarly, the first mention coming 
from the Commission about the topic takes place on 15 April 2010 in a speech from Olli Rehn (the 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Policy) called “Reinforcing economic 
governance in Europe” (Rehn 2010), which was given in a moment when Greece’s 10-year borrowing 
costs had reached 8.7% and the risk of contagion was becoming real, after the sovereign credit ratings 
of Portugal and Spain had been downgraded by Standard & Poor’s. 
Calming the markets and preventing financial contagion was an important concern for all actors: 
in a speech from January 2011, Commission President Barroso defended the need for furthering even 
more economic integration by stating that “the markets [were] demanding more coordination at 
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European level” (Barroso 2011). Indeed, the reinforcing of fiscal coordination is usually presented 
together with crisis-dealing mechanisms, as a way of showing commitment not only to solving and 
overcoming the Euro crisis, but also to making sure that preventive measures would be taken. On 6 May 
2010, Merkel and Sarkozy stated in a joint letter their support for the first bailout package for Greece 
while emphasizing the need to “go further and . . . [take] all necessary measures to avoid a repetition of 
this kind of crisis”. In this letter, they explicitly mentioned that their aim is to “strengthen the Euro 
Area’s economic governance” (Merkel and Sarkozy 2010). The next day, a statement from Barroso 
linked the increasing of economic policy coordination to the defense of the Euro (Barroso 2010a).  
In October of the same year, Merkel and Sarkozy agreed at the so-called Deauville summit to 
link the creation of a crisis resolution mechanism with the introduction of sanctions for states running 
excessive deficits and threatening the stability of the Eurozone (Sarkozy 2010). A final example of this 
pattern can be found in March 2011, when the Heads of State of the EA agreed to the Euro Plus Pact, 
which stablished a “stronger economic policy coordination for competitiveness and convergence” 
(Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area 2011)- the same day that the first adjustments to the 
Greek bailout package took place.  
Key actors 
In terms of agenda-setting during the European response to the crisis, two blocks seem to have 
had a leading role: while the Commission was the main actor concerning the European Semester and 
the Six-pack, France and Germany had a major role in leading the Euro Plus Pact and the TSCG. 
 Concerning the European Semester, the idea was first mentioned by Rehn on 15 April 2010 (Rehn 
2010), and appears as the first concrete policy measure in terms of fiscal coordination.  It was further 
developed in a Communication from the Commission on 12 May 2010 (European Commission 2010a) 
and endorsed without any changes by the European Council in June (European Council 2010a). It is 
important to stress that the European Semester was an independent initiative coming from the 
Commission, where the institution acted as the sole policy entrepreneur. In this line, many elements of 
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the European Semester have been identified as being “already present, at least in embryonic forms, 
since early 2000s reports by the Commission” (Schön-Quinlivan and Scipioni 2017, 1184). 
The first draft for the Six-pack was presented by the Commission in September 2010 (European 
Commission 2010c), following the mandate of the March summit of Heads of State of the EA (Heads 
of State and Government of the Euro Area 2010). This has been seen by Chang (2013, p. 259) as the 
European Council taking from the Commission its “normal function as agenda setter”. The draft was 
endorsed by Van Rompuy (president of the European Council at that time) on 18 October 2010 as “a 
major step forward” (Van Rompuy 2010) and by the European Council itself in the summit of the same 
month. In the conclusions of the summit, the Heads of State even asked for “a fast track approach to be 
followed on the adoption of secondary legislation needed for the implementation of ...the 
recommendations” (European Council 2010b). The final version of the Six-pack ended up being very 
similar to this first draft, an outcome that suggests that the Commission initiated and led these measures 
with wide agreement coming from member states. The resemblance of the Commission proposal with 
the interests and preferences of the Heads of State has been identified as a key factor in the fast approval 
of these measures (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016, 518). 
The role of France and Germany as the strongest member states seems to have been crucial in 
the agreement of the Euro Plus Pact, following a pattern which repeated itself all during the negotiation 
processes linked to the Euro crisis: Merkel and Sarkozy would first join their positions through a series 
of bilateral agreements, and would then negotiate together with the other countries. In this case, both 
leaders gave a joint press conference on 4 February 2011 asking for a pact for competitiveness and an 
agreement in concrete measures enhancing convergence and integration in European economies (BBC 
2011) and bringing together areas such as “retirement age, corporation tax, public sector wages policy, 
limits on public spending and harmoni[z]ing welfare and social security systems” (The Guardian 
2011a). This would end up setting the basis for the Euro Plus Pact, an agreement reached the 11 March 
2011 which developed in all areas laid out by Merkel and Sarkozy. 
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Finally, the TSCG can also be seen as a Franco-German-led Treaty. The negotiation process 
started in December 2011, when a joint letter from Merkel and Sarkozy to Van Rompuy stressed the 
necessity of enshrining the Six-pack provisions on public debt into the Treaties. They also stated the 
“need to take a decision at [the] next European Council meeting in order to have the new treaty 
provisions ready by March 2012” (Merkel and Sarkozy 2011). Indeed, the final Treaty would be signed 
in March 2012, building upon their demands. Interviews carried out by Schoeller (2017) present the 
TSCG as a German-led initiative, partly conceived as a sign to German voters (p. 12). 
Reasons for delegation 
As has  seen, the process of furthering integration increased the role and powers of the European 
Commission in the area of economic and fiscal governance, mostly in terms of monitoring, but also 
enhancing its sanctioning power. Throughout the different negotiations, there was a constant trend in 
most of the Commission’s statements and communications, that of vindicating the institution’s 
“expertise, independence and impartiality” (Barroso 2010b). Both when it came to Barroso’s and 
Rehn’s speeches and to policy proposals, there was an underlying emphasis on the way strong 
supranational institutions should be a key element in economic governance: “Europe can only be strong 
if it is able to act in a coordinated manner, with strong institutions, with a common governance” (Barroso 
2011). 
It is necessary to stress that the Commission was not the only advocate of this trend: it had a 
strong ally in Germany, for whom increasing the Commission’s power was a tool for ensuring the 
commitment of those countries at risk of not complying with fiscal discipline, as well as giving a sign 
to German voters that “their taxpayer money would not be exposed to moral hazard” (Schoeller 2017, 
13) . A clear example of this was the debate, in the framework of the Six-pack, on whether to implement 
automatic sanctions for those countries running larger deficits than allowed. Both Germany and the 
Commission were strong supporters of this measure (BBC 2010) that would increase the power of the 
supranational institution. The same pattern can be found concerning the TSCG: this was an 
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intergovernmental Treaty led by Franco-German interests, which nevertheless aimed to achieve “a 
greater role for the European Commission in drafting national budgets” (Council on Foreign Relations 
2011).  
Finally, even if the general trend was a consensus for increasing the Commission’s powers, there 
was also a tension present among member states and the Commission on whether fiscal coordination 
ought to be developed within or outside standard Community procedures. In a speech from November 
2010, Merkel stated that “sometimes a coordinated European position can be achieved by applying the 
intergovernmental method. The crucial thing is that on important issues we have common positions” 
(Merkel 2010). Three weeks later, Barroso stated in the EP what can be understood as an answer to such 
a statement: “I count on the Community method to work as well as it has always done, and help us 
strengthen economic governance in Europe and the Euro Area” (Barroso 2010b).  Later on, in a speech 
in February 2011 concerning the ESM, Barroso presented his concerns about the mechanism being 
largely intergovernmental, stating that the Commission would have preferred it being developed within 
the community framework. Indeed, the interviews carried out by Schoeller (2017) suggest that “the 
Commission and the EP would have preferred a solution within EU law” (p. 13). 
Negotiation outcomes 
As it has been developed in the driving forces subsection, the European Semester’s final 
outcome was quite similar to the first proposal presented by the Commission. Thus, this subsection will 
elaborate on the other three main decisions in fiscal coordination during the analyzed period: the Six-
pack, the Euro Plus Pact, and the TSCG.  
The main issue of controversy concerning the Six-pack was the introduction of automatic 
sanctions for the non-compliant member states in the framework of the excessive deficit procedure: this 
was a German demand which persisted all throughout the negotiations concerning economic and fiscal 
governance (Euractiv 2010, Telegraph 2010, The Guardian 2010) and that was supported by the 
Commission. The first draft of the Six-pack included an automatic “reversed voting mechanism 
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...[meaning] that the Commission’s proposal for a sanction [would] be considered and adopted unless 
the Council [turned] it down by qualified majority” (European Commission 2010b). This mechanism 
found strong opposition coming from France (BBC, 2010; Euractiv, 2011), eventually leading to a 
modification in the final version, in which sanctions are applied in a gradual way, giving more time to 
national governments to take the necessary measures before being fined.  
In the case of the Euro Plus Pact, it has already been shown that the initiative came from a united 
Franco-German front. As such, it presented a combination of both countries’ demands since the 
beginning of the crisis. For Germany, a commitment towards stronger economic convergence was a 
necessary condition before any agreement was made to increase the country’s participation in bailout 
funds.  As for France, this was a major step towards a common economic government of the Eurozone, 
something that Merkel had been resisting for months, given a preference towards keeping non-Euro 
countries as part of the strengthening in economic governance (The Guardian 2011a). The Pact itself, 
signed the 11 March 2011, ended up being a continuation of Franco-German demands, elaborating on 
these and without the introduction of major changes.  
As for the TSCG, it has been defined as a “second best solution” for Germany (Spiegel 2011). 
The initiative for the new Treaty came from a joint letter from Merkel and Sarkozy on 7 December 2011 
emphasizing the necessity of including the new provisions in fiscal coordination, notably those from 
the Six-pack, into the EU Treaties. This letter included Germany’s long-term demand ( BBC, 2011) for 
embedding the agreed public debt objectives within member states’ constitutions, as well as France’s 
will to have a more institutionalized Eurozone government (Merkel and Sarkozy 2011).   
The final Treaty shows a broad resemblance to the joint letter’s contents, with two main 
exceptions. The first one refers to the transposition of public debt limits into national constitutions; 
according to Kreilinger (2012), the first draft of the Treaty included an obligation to introduce this rule 
“in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature”. The final version, however, 
includes a less strict statement: “[T]he rules mentioned ...shall take effect in the national law... through 
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provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional” (TSCG, art 3.2). This 
modification did not respond as much to a concession coming from Germany as to the aim of avoiding 
a ratification referendum in Ireland, something that would have taken place in case of changing the 
country’s constitution (Kreilinger 2012).  
The most important change from the Franco-German initiative concerned the nature of the 
Treaty itself. While the first intention was to modify the existing EU Treaties, the UK vetoed the 
proposal, making it necessary to opt for a new intergovernmental treaty, signed by all European 
countries except for the Czech Republic and the UK. This was seen as a strong setback for Merkel, who 
had been pushing for all European members to be on board (Spiegel 2011).  
Preference formation 
The negotiation process analyzed presents both patterns of national and supranational preference 
formation. It is important to emphasize that even if there was a convergence of preferences towards 
further economic integration, the motivations behind these interests differed among the various actors.  
National-based interests seem to have been especially important in the cases of Germany and 
the UK. In the case of Germany, it can be said that the national constraints played a strong role in 
defining the country’s preferences. For Merkel, measures such as automatic sanctions or the tightening 
of fiscal rules appeared as a counterbalance in front of the electorate and other national veto players for 
justifying Germany’s participation in bailout packages and financial aid mechanisms towards periphery 
countries (see, for example, Spiegel 2011). The case of the UK is the clearest example of national 
preferences defining negotiation positions during the studied period, as can be seen by Cameron 
justifying the British veto to the TSCG in the following manner: “I said that if I couldn't get adequate 
safeguards for Britain in a new European treaty then I wouldn't agree to it. What is on offer isn't in 
Britain's interests so I didn't agree to it" (Cameron quoted by The Guardian, 2011b). 
Supranational preference formation was also visible during this time framework. Notably, all 
the bilateral statements between France and Germany (i.e. those from the 6 May 2010, 18 October 2010, 
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4 February 2011, and 7 December 2011) came after the Heads of State of the two countries had 
discussed which were the best options for achieving a common goal.  During this process, the initial 
preferences defended by both countries went through changes, some of which have already been 
mentioned: France accepting the inclusion of quasi-automatic sanctions in the Six-pack (see Euractiv, 
2011 and the final version of the legislation) or Germany accepting the French demand of 
institutionalizing a Euro government are the most visible examples. 
Assessing the expectations 
After reconstructing the negotiation process, this section will assess the expectations of each 
theory with the actual development of the events.  
Neofunctionalism 
As seen in the theoretical framework subsection, Neofunctionalism would expect economic and 
fiscal integration in the Euro crisis to be the result of spillover processes, led by supranational and 
transnational actors. Neofunctionalism would expect the Commission to have had a leading role as the 
main agenda-setter during the negotiations. The Commission was indeed a very active actor as a policy 
entrepreneur, mostly in what concerns the European Semester and the Six-pack. However, it is 
necessary to remark that the proposal for the Six-pack came after the European Council tasked the 
institution to come up with economic governance measures, something that may question the 
Commission role as agenda-setter. Furthermore, Neofunctionalism fails to explain the leading role 
played by France and Germany all throughout the crisis, and mostly when it came to the Euro Plus Pact 
and the TSCG. 
As a driving force, functional spillover can be a plausible explanation for the strengthening of 
fiscal coordination. From this point of view, the crisis would be seen as the result of functional pressures 
coming from monetary integration, which can only be solved by extending integration to another area: 
fiscal coordination. Indeed, the analysis has shown that the measures adopted during the Euro crisis 
were decided as a way of dealing with economic imbalances, a direct consequence of the monetary 
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union. However, as pointed out by Schimmelfennig (2015), it fails to explain why economic integration 
didn’t go further. 
The reasons for delegation can be partially explained in terms of cultivated spillover. The 
analysis has indeed shown that both Barroso and Rehn vindicated the role of their institution all 
throughout the negotiations. Furthermore, policy proposals coming from the Commission (such as the 
first draft of the Six-pack) aimed to increase the role and power of this institution in a context when 
rapid action was needed and there were no other initiatives. However, it is difficult to assess to what 
extent these elements finally influenced the choice for delegation.  
As for the negotiation outcomes, Neofunctionalism would stress the fact that the final outcome 
of both the European Semester and the Six-pack were indeed very similar to the original Commission’s 
proposals. However, Neofunctionalism overlooks the fact that the Commission’s proposals advanced 
in a context where the institution’s interests corresponded to those of Germany. In this line, it should 
not be forgotten that the Commission was operating in a situation in which Heads of State could “change 
the structure of the negotiating game by threatening to adopt new rules or move to other decision-
making settings” (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016, 515), thus limiting the room of maneuver of the 
Commission. 
Finally, the analysis has proved that, even if preference formation shifted to some extent towards 
the transnational level, national interests still played a very important role, such as Merkel advocating 
for tougher sanctions because of her national constraints, or the UK justifying their veto to any Treaty 
changes in terms of national interests.  
In conclusion, Neofunctionalism provides only a partial explanation in what concerns the 
driving forces of integration in terms of functional spillover, the reasons for delegation and the 
negotiation outcomes. However, it fails at explaining the leading role played by France and Germany 
all throughout the process, as well as the importance of national interests.  
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
A LI approach to the negotiation process would focus on the economic interdependence among 
states as an explanation for further integration, on the relative bargaining power of strong member states 
and on credible commitments as the main reason for delegation. This theory would expect strong 
member states to be the key actors of the process. Indeed, France and Germany had a leading role all 
throughout the analyzed period, and especially concerning the Euro Plus Pact and the TSCG. All the 
bilateral meetings between France and Germany, as well as their joint letters and statements, proved to 
have had a strong influence in agenda-setting during the Euro crisis. LI, however, would expect the 
Commission to have a more marginal role during the process than it had for the European Semester and 
the Six-pack. 
The economic integration process resulting from the crisis can be seen as the result of economic 
interdependence, as expected by LI: member states acknowledging that a joint response to the crisis 
would be more effective for their national economic interests than a separate one. However, there is an 
important flaw within this approach, since it overlooks the fact that this decision was conditioned by 
the existing monetary union, and as such, it could be considered the result of unintended consequences. 
In other words, member states did not really have the choice of a separate response to the crisis. 
Concerning the reasons for delegation, the creation of credible commitments has indeed proved 
to be one of the main motivations for Germany: giving power to the Commission was a tool for ensuring 
that all countries in the Eurozone would embrace fiscal discipline.  LI also gives a plausible explanation 
for the negotiation outcomes: most of the measures adopted during the crisis corresponded to the 
interests of the two strongest countries, Germany and France. Even when it came to the European 
Semester and the Six-pack, for which the Commission was the main policy entrepreneur, the final 
outcome of these measures favored the preferences shown by these two countries. This explanation 
serves also for the UK vetoing any Treaty changes: the strong bargaining position of the country in this 
matter ended up leading to a new Treaty configuration. 
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As for preference formation, LI would expect preferences to be defined in the national arena. 
This is a good explanation for the aforementioned role of the UK in the TSCG negotiations, as well as 
for the strong position of Germany about the establishment of tougher sanctions. However, the 
importance of Franco-German bilateral meetings during the crisis suggests that the supranational arena 
also played a role in the definition of common, transnational preferences.  
Given this assessment, it can be concluded that LI provides a coherent explanation in what 
concerns the key actors, the reasons for delegation, and the negotiation outcomes. It also gives a 
plausible explanation, although with some limits, of the driving forces of the process. The main 
limitation coming from this theory is that it does not provide a fully satisfactory explanation in terms of 
preference formation: even if national interests seem to have been very important, it is not possible to 
overlook the role of common positions coming from transnational negotiations between Germany and 
France.  
New Intergovernmentalism 
The last theory to be assessed, NI, would focus on two expectations from the analyzed process: 
an increasing importance of intergovernmental arenas such as the Council and the European Council, 
and a deliberative, consensus-seeking decision-making pattern among all member states during 
negotiations. As an intergovernmentalist theory, NI considers member states as the most important 
actors in negotiations. Indeed, we have seen that Germany and France, as the two strongest countries, 
can be considered the main actors of the process. However, while NI expects the Council and the 
European Council to lead the process, the analysis has shown that, in reality, bilateral meetings between 
Merkel and Sarkozy were of greater importance than the meetings of the European Council as a whole.  
The explanation given by NI concerning the driving forces of integration is in fact the same as 
the one provided by LI, and thus the same assessment and critics can be applied. The choice for 
integration can be explained as the result of rational member states realizing that a joint response to the 
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crisis would be beneficial for their national interests. However, this explanation is incomplete if it does 
not acknowledge the importance of the monetary union as a decisive factor.  
NI fails to give an explanation for delegation of power towards the Commission. This theory 
would expect member states to look for intergovernmental arrangements which would allow integration 
without delegation. While this was the case for the Euro Plus Pact, and to some extent for the TSCG (it 
is an intergovernmental treaty, and thus beyond the community method, but at the same time it increases 
the power of the Commission), the other measures in terms of fiscal and economic coordination ended 
up giving more power to the Commission. Furthermore, this delegation was backed by member states, 
and was explicitly supported by Germany and France.  
For NI, negotiation outcomes are expected to be the result of deliberative, consensus-seeking 
processes. This can be applied to the described pattern of Franco-German relations during the crisis, 
where the common positions coming from the two countries was the result of deliberation in a 
transnational arena. However, NI would expect all EU countries to participate in the deliberations on 
the outcome. In spite of the frequent European Council meetings during the crisis, the outcomes were 
more determined by the common positions reached between France and Germany. Furthermore, an 
approach to outcomes based on consensus-seeking deliberations fails to explain the role of the UK 
vetoing the initial plans for the TSCG. Finally, even if NI gives a good explanation for those preferences 
defined in the transnational arena (i.e. Franco-German common positions), it fails, like 
Neofunctionalism, to give a satisfactory explanation for the relevance of Germany’s national constraints 
or the role of the UK national interests. 
There are some variables of the analysis that can be partially explained by NI: member states as 
the key actors, economic interdependence as a driving force or the consensus-seeking patterns found in 
the relations between France and Germany. However, it fails at predicting a deepening of integration 
without delegation. Furthermore, NI expects deliberation to be the pattern among all member states and 
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not only among the strong ones, something that did not happen during the crisis. Finally, it also 
overlooks the role of national preferences.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis just presented has answered the initial research question by identifying the key actors and 
driving forces of the negotiation processes that led to more integration during the Euro crisis. The study 
has shown that the deepening in fiscal and economic coordination during the analyzed period was 
triggered as a response to the crisis. This can be seen both as a process of functional spillover coming 
from monetary integration and creating a path-dependence effect, and as the result of rational member 
states acknowledging that a joint action would be the most beneficial for their national economic 
interests: these two logics do not necessarily contradict each other. As for the key actors, the 
reconstruction of the negotiation processes has shown that France and Germany were the two main 
actors in what concerns both agenda setting and influence in the final outcome.  
The analysis has also shown which mechanisms and elements coming from all three theories are 
more useful for understanding the integration process during the Euro crisis. Neofunctionalism gives a 
coherent explanation of integration as a result of a spillover process, and it also succeeds in predicting 
that supranational the Commission would use its role as policy initiator to extend its competences in a 
context where rapid action was needed.  However, it shows strong limits when it comes to explaining 
the central role of member states both in defining the agenda and driving the process. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism seems to supply a better response for our research question, by 
providing a clear explanation of the final outcomes of the negotiation process as the result of the two 
strongest member states (France and Germany) pushing for their interests, and delegating power to the 
supranational level in order to create credible commitments. However, it overlooks the fact that member 
states may be locked in during this process. Finally, New Intergovernmentalism can shed light, when 
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applied to the case of France and Germany, on the building of common positions through deliberation 
among member states in a supranational arena. 
All in all, the deepening on fiscal and economic  coordination can be theorized as the result of 
asymmetrical interdependence and differences in bargaining power among member states, which decide 
to transfer national sovereignty as a tool for reaching credible commitments. This paper has provided 
an exhaustive analysis of the negotiation processes leading to further fiscal and economic coordination. 
This choice for an exhaustive analysis has been an important tool for answering the research question, 
but it can also be seen as the main limitation of the paper, for leaving outside other decisions in economic 
governance taken during the same period. For this reason, the study just presented gives scope to further 
research on the negotiation processes of the European Stability Mechanism and the strengthening of the 
Banking Union. The same limitation applies to the actors analyzed: while this paper has focused on the 
role of France, Germany and the European Commission, further research could focus on the role of 
other member states and supranational institutions.  
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